Substituting it in the utility function, taking the derivative, and assuming symmetric equi-
Using the implicit function theorem,
. Then,
. From here, we conclude that
> 0 since U CC < 0, U CG > 0, and U GG < 0. Also,
Proof of Proposition 2. Just like in the proof of Proposition 1, the first order condition for the maximization problem of the pivotal voter is F = −
, G * i = 0. Using the implicit function theorem,
Outcomes Under Majority Rule
Model
In this section, we solve the model numerically, using the minimum winning coalition concept discussed in Baron (1991) , instead of the universalism solution concept in the paper.
As in Baron (1991) , there are representatives from N districts. One representative is chosen randomly and asked to make a proposal on the total amount G of the public good and its allocation among the districts. After the proposal is made, each representative votes for or against the proposal. If the majority vote for the proposal, it passes. If the majority vote against the proposal, it fails, and the game repeats in the next period with a potentially new representative randomly chosen to make a proposal.
In order to solve for the amount of public good, we take the utility function of each representative to be constant elasticity of substitution:
We now introduce a discount factor between periods of the proposing game, δ.
Solution
The representative who makes a proposal (representative 1 without loss of generality) needs support of only
other representatives. Therefore, he allocates G 1 to his district, G 2 to a randomly chosen
other representatives, and 0 to the remaining
representatives.
Thus, our goal is to find the optimal G 1 and G 2 for representative 1 to propose.
Representatives who are allocated G 2 will vote for the proposal only if their utility from G 2 exceeds their utility from rejecting the proposal and going into the next period of the proposing game. The utility from accepting G 2 is U (G 2 , C). The utility of postponing the choice into the next period is discounted by δ and consists of three parts. First, with probability 1/N this representative might be chosen to make the proposal, thus, getting U (G 1 , C). Second, with probability
, the representative will again get to vote for G 2 , thus receiving U (G 2 , C). Third, with the remaining probability
, the representative will not be chosen to receive the public good, thus obtaining utility U (0, C). Note, that C is the same for all districts, since C =
and depends only on the total amount of public good G. In equilibrium the proposed G 2 will be just enough to make the
representatives receiving it vote for the proposal. This means that their utility today must be at least as large as tomorrow's utility:
The optimization problem that the proposing representative faces is to maximize U (G 1 , C) subject to (1). Ideally, one would be able to express G 2 in terms of G 1 from (1), then substitute this G 2 into C and maximize U (G 1 , C) as a function of only G 1 . However, equation (1) involves the summation of three terms each in the power 1 ρ rendering the analytic solution impossible. To have some sense of the results, we solve the model numerically.
Numerical Results
For the numerical computation, we fix a number of parameters. We set α 1 = α 2 = 1 (equal weight is put on public and private goods in the utility function), p C = p G = 1 (the prices of private and public good are identical); I = 100 (income per capita is normalized to 100), L = 10 (population is 10), and δ = 0.97 (discount rate is 0.97). For different values of ρ we compute the total amount of public good G = G 1 + N −1 2 G 2 and let N , A and ρ vary.
For fixed ρ, we examine council sizes (N ) 3 to 19 and grant sizes (A) 10 to 100 (by 10). The resulting grid allows us to approximate the derivative of interest,
, and check its sign.
We start with the case ρ = −3 (public and private goods are closer to being complements), presented in Appendix . To do so, for a given N , we subtract the value of G at A = k from the value of G at A = k + 10. This is equivalent to subtracting the left column from the right column for each N . For a given N the values of this derivative are almost identical (subject to computation errors). This means that
∂A 2 = 0, and so we report only one value for each N . The first row of Appendix Table 2 reports these values.
As N increases,
is positive, just like in Proposition 3 in the paper.
We present the results for the same exercise when ρ = −0.5 in the second row of Appendix Table 2 . Again,
∂A 2 = 0 so we present only one value for each N . As when ρ = −3, ∂G ∂A increases with N , and thus What does this dependence on ρ mean? As the number of districts increases, the representative making a proposal must divide the total amount of public good G among more districts, so his share of the public good, G 1 , as well as the share that he allocates to other representatives, G 2 , decreases. However, G 2 is allocated to a larger number of districts as their number increases, so the total amount of public good,
or decrease in N . In this minimal winning coalition framework, whether G increases or decreases depends on the elasticity of substitution in the CES utility function (ε = 1/(1 − ρ), so dependent solely on ρ).
When ρ is negative (ε < 1), the public and private goods are more complementary. Therefore, as the number of districts increases, the optimal choice for the proposing representative is to have C and G 1 move together, so as G 1 goes down, so does C. Since consumption decreases, the representative can afford not to bring down G 1 and G 2 by too much, and the total amount of public good increases with the number of districts.
When ρ is positive (ε > 1), the public and private goods are more substitutable. Therefore, as the number of districts increases, the first representative compensates for the decrease in G 1 by increasing C. Since consumption increases, both G 1 and G 2 decline further than they do for the case of negative ρ. In fact, they decrease so much that the total amount of public good, G, also decreases as the number of districts increases.
Appendix B: Verifying the Block Grant Formula
In order to verify that the CDBG program follows the legislated formula, we replicate annual grant allocations using the same publicly available data the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does in its own calculations. To do this, we relied heavily on HUD's excellent reports that detail the formula (Neary and Richardson, 1995; Richardson et al., 2003; Richardson, 2005) .
We compare our constructed allocations to the "actual" data, both the annual desig- First we attempt to identify entitlement jurisdictions. A city becomes an entitled city if it either (a) is in a metropolitan area and has a population over 50,000 in a given year 1 , (b) is the principal city of a metropolitan area, or (c) has ever been an entitled city in the past for two consecutive years (after 1989 only).
2 This first population and metropolitan area criteria is measurable using decennial census data from 1975 to 1990 (see below for information on when data become available to HUD), combined with MSA status by county.
3 From 1990 to the present, the population and MSA status cutoff is measurable using Census population estimates for cities, which are publicly available. We do not use these data before 1990
because annual population estimates for cities are not available before 1990. The second condition, whether a city is a primary city of a metropolitan area, is not verifiable with publicly-available data. The census does not publish primary cities by metropolitan areas 1 As does HUD, we use "metropolitan area" to refer to the variously-named Office of Management and Budget-defined metropolitan agglomerations, variously known as Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Core-Based Statistical Areas, New England Town Areas, etc.
2 In practice, cities that receive grants once only very very rarely lose their entitlement status (email from Miller).
3 For New England, MSAs are defined by town.
historically (they are defined by county for most of the country), nor are the employment data by city, which would be necessary for us to replicate the designation, publicly available.
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Using only the population criteria, we can correctly identify roughly three-quarters of actual entitled cities across all the sample years. Appendix Table 7 eighty percent for all pre-1982 years. Our task is then to divide up this total allocation for entitled jurisdictions among entitled cities and counties. Though our paper does not focus on counties, we cannot calculate city shares without also calculating county shares as they both take pieces from the same pie.
Each entitled city and county's share is assigned via a formula. From 1975 to 1977, there was a single formula that allocated each entitled jurisdiction's share of the pie as
The index c ∈ {1, ..., C} denotes a city (though this formula is identical for counties), and M A denotes all metropolitan areas (sum of values for all MSAs). The variables are pov, the total number of people with income less than the poverty line, pop, the total population, and ov crwd, or the number of people living in housing with less than 1.01 rooms per person.
Also from 1975 to 1977, actual allocations included grandfathered receipts from the prior program of application-based grants. We do not include these grandfathered amounts in our constructed allocations.
Starting in 1978, and continuing to the present, cities and counties were assigned grants based on the maximum of two formulae: Here EC denotes all entitled cities. 5 The new variables are age, the number of housing units built before 1940, and growth lag, which is the lack of growth since 1960fs. During the twoformula era, a city's share is the maximum of the two shares above: max(grant A,c , grant B,c ).
HUD detests the growth lag variable because it is difficult to calculate and relies on information that must sometimes be estimated. It is meant to capture how much a city has deviated from the mean growth of all cities since 1960. We make our best approximation from publicly available data without reconstructing municipal border changes (which is what HUD does). In any given year, the numerator growth lag c for a city c is calculated by
growth rate c ) − pop c , and
5 Counties use the same formula, with the exception of the denominator for growth lag, which is replaced by the total growth lag in all entitled jurisdictions (cities and counties) (Richardson et al. (2003) , p. 5). The current year population is the county population minus the population residing in entitled cities. The mean growth rate is the growth rate of all entitled communities (unlike for cities, which just uses the mean city growth rate). Parallel to the cities, if a county grows more than the mean of all entitlement communities, it receives a growth lag value of is zero (Richardson et al. (2003) , p. 5 and p. 56-7 for details). Note that county funds are to be spent on unentitled or unincorporated jurisdictions within the county.
These formulae assign a share of the grant pie in each year. In the years with the dual formula system, this system assigns more than the entire pie, so HUD reduces each entitled community's share, keeping the relative shares constant. Specifically, assignment is done In rare cases, some cities choose to decline entitled city status in order to receive funds with an entitled urban county -usually this occurs when the county would fail to receive funds without the city's population. In general, cities are loath to do this, because there is no guarantee the county will allocate the city as much money as it would have gotten on its own. Six cities which would otherwise be entitled and receive grants choose to be part of entitled urban counties: Palm Bay, FL; Duluth, MN; Pharr, TX; West Jordan, UT;
Bremerton, WA; Vancouver, WA; and Rapid City, SD. We calculate grants for these cities when they are entitled cities, but we drop them in all of our analytical work.
Our constructed allocations give a quite good match to the actual allocations for entitled cities, as shown in Appendix Table 8 . Only in the first two years, which include some grandfathered allocations, is the correlation between the constructed allocation and the actual allocation less than 0.97. The average correlation across the thirty years of the sample is 0.98. We do not do quite as well for matching county allocations, but this is not a challenge to the estimation as the county allocations merely change the amount of funds available to entitled cities, not cities' relative shares.
Panels A and B of Figure 1 show the quality of the match for two years on a log scale so that all cities can be viewed. For both graphs, the line is the metaphorical 45-degree line, where all cities would lie if our constructed grant exactly matched the actual grant.
The top panel of the figure shows our match in 1976, the year in which our constructed allocation is least correlated with the actual allocation. This is not entirely unexpected as this year -and the first 6 years of the program -included grandfathering from previous programs consolidated into the CDBG. Even so, in 1976 the correlation between the true and constructed grant is 0.88. 6 In 1995, shown in the bottom panel, the correlation is even stronger, at 0.98.
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The structure of the data suggest two potentially useful discontinuities for estimation:
the introduction of new data in the formula, and the entry of new cities into the program.
The first, a regression discontinuity approach as in Gordon (2004) to be a promising margin along which to find variation. As Appendix Table 3 shows, most entrants arrive in the later years of the program, when both average funding and variation in funding are low.
Consolidated cities (e.g., Athens-Clarke County, GA or Nashville-Davidson, TN) receive 6 The points along the x-axis are cities to which HUD allocated funds, but for which we do not observe information to construct an allocation.
7 Further details on the quality of the match are in Appendix B.
funds as entitled cities.
Appendix C: Data Sources
Our dataset is at the city-year level, with observations from 1975 to 2004. Data comes from the sources listed below.
The decennial census data serve as the frame to which all other data are added Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Set of maximal covariates are as described in the notes for Table 2 .
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